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The penetration of the Internet in Korean society is usu-
ally seen as a positive development, perhaps even a mod-
el for other countries; more effi cient bureaucracy, more 
political fi gures making use of political blogs, and great-
er opportunities for citizen participation seem to connect 
government and citizens in a mutually benefi cial way. 
Nevertheless the past six months have witnessed events 
resulting from an impersonal and seemingly uncontrolled 
Internet-based social mobilization that casts the shadow 
of the effects of unmediated online activity on social and 
political life: a vehement series of protests against the 
signing of the U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement in April, 
which led to the resignation of several senior offi cials and 
ministers in the new Lee Myung-bak administration and 
a number of deaths of Korean celebrities as a result of 
smear campaigns mounted and spread across the Web.1
Although the latter episodes do not fall within the realm 
of politics, such suicides nevertheless raise the issue of 
whether a state should somehow regulate the free fl ow of 
information.
Discussions of the role of the Internet in politics (and 
society) have dominated the Korean media during the 
past few months. Surprisingly, the debate has yet to reach 
academia. In fact, the link between Internet activity and 
populism, as this type of behavior has been referred to 
in popular parlance (without proper reference to the 
academic use of the term) is underexplored both theo-
retically and empirically. To be sure, both populism and 
Internet-based sociopolitical action have been the objects 
of academic study. There is a considerable body of litera-
ture on populism, its ideological underpinning, and its 
empirical manifestations with regard to both West and 
Central Europe and Latin America.2 Research on Inter-
net technology has focused on the information divide between 
the rich and the poor and the educated and the less educated, 
and also on the positive or negative effects of technology on 
politics, namely e-government, electoral campaigns, or Internet 
discussions.3
We know surprisingly little, however, about how populist 
movements and leaders make use of the Internet for political 
ends. The issue itself is far from new, as occasional debates 
among netizens in East Asia over national sentiments (the dis-
pute over the Dokdo Islands between South Korea and Japan, 
for example) dominate the Web. Online discussion boards are 
often instruments for sparking street demonstrations or even 
shaping electoral campaigns. This paper constitutes an explor-
ative attempt to make sense of the type of behavior—primarily 
the candlelight vigils in the spring in 2008—that took place in 
South Korea; it is undertaken in order to understand the role 
that the Internet and Internet culture play in politics. By doing 
so, this paper also seeks to conceptualize “digital populism” 
as a new type of political behavior marked by the political use 
of the Internet as both a form of political participation and an 
instrument of mobilization.
There seems to be a paradox in the highly technological societ-
ies of East Asia, and in Korea in particular. On the one hand the 
decline of the mass party and its role in linking elites with citi-
zens and a decreasing electoral turnout have led some to point 
to a lack of participation and interest of ordinary people in poli-
tics. On the other hand, with the rapid development of informa-
tion technology, citizens are getting more involved in political 
discussions. The candlelight vigils in South Korea in the spring 
of 2008 well illustrate the mobilizing power of online blogs, 
chats, and discussion boards that sparked street demonstra-
tions against the government policy of approval of a free-trade 
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agreement (FTA) with the United States. The candlelight 
vigils4 led to administrative shuffl es (three ministers re-
placed) and the appointment of new presidential senior 
advisers (seven senior presidential secretaries out of 
eight were replaced). Given that most of the original ap-
pointments were fewer than three months old, this was 
no minor event in Korean politics. Direct participation is 
having an effect on representative democracy.
The April 2008 FTA Deal and the Wave of 
Popular Protests
In early April 2008 the United States and South Korea 
signed an FTA after months of intense negotiation.5
While this was heralded by the offi cials of the two par-
ties as a way to take the already signifi cant trade volume 
between the two countries to a new level, reaction on the 
streets of South Korean cities suggested that many were 
unhappy with the deal.6 On the Korean side, concerns 
focused on the possible resulting lack of competitiveness 
of South Korean businesses although the scrapping of 
tariffs would ensure that companies such as KIA, Hyun-
dai, Samsung, and others would benefi t from easier ac-
cess to the U.S. market.
The FTA decision sparked a large wave of nationwide 
strikes, rallies, and demonstrations. While street protests 
have led to clashes with the police (which continued 
until late July 2008), what is interesting to note is the 
role played by the Internet in mobilizing ordinary people 
against the deal and, as a result, against the government 
(forcing senior aides to the president and ministers to re-
sign).
South Korea is among the most wired societies in the 
world, and the importance of online networks has gained 
increased prominence not only in social relations (online 
games, PC rooms, online dating, cyberblogs) but even in 
public life. The Roh Moo-hyun administration owed a lot 
of its support to netizens. Political support expressed on 
the Web greatly contributed to the election of Roh Moo-
hyun in 2002, and when the opposition sought to impeach 
him in 2004 the widespread popular furor hit not only the 
streets but especially the Internet as a thunderstorm.
The 2008 protests, the peculiarities of the current situa-
tion notwithstanding, started similarly, namely, through 
an Internet-fueled mobilization, with its new language 
(for example, 2MB and Agorians7). Popular participation 
and direct action grew as a result of the facilitating role 
of the Internet and online networks, which reduce trans-
action costs and reach wider audiences than traditional 
means. But is this direct democracy or is it Internet-in-
duced street mobbing?
The lack of popular participation in public life is often 
lamented in modern democracies. That more and more 
citizens become interested in what happens in their coun-
tries should be obviously seen as a welcome develop-
ment. At the same time, however, the current wave of 
protests and the modus operandi of the protestors have 
worrying implications for democratic systems. The Inter-
net allows quicker and easier contacts among citizens of 
any country. More crucial (and troubling) is that the spon-
taneous, uncontrolled fl ow of information and prompt re-
sponse have two important consequences: fi rst, reliance 
on offi cial sources of information dramatically decreases 
as people tend to rely on unverifi ed information freely 
available online; second, an emotional approach to poli-
tics replaces a more rational one.
Any type of information, whatever its reliability, prompts 
an immediate and emotional reaction. The current FTA 
protests are a case in point. Compared with citizens who 
rely less on the Internet, netizens are less concerned about 
pondering the advantages or problems associated with 
the introduction of an FTA between South Korea and the 
United States, and they seem more eager to express or 
channel their anger against the authorities, whatever their 
actual faults. This targets one of the pillars of a democrat-
ic system: the fact that representatives are, in fact, just 
representatives—elected offi cials who, for a fi xed period 
of time, govern the country and are eventually account-
able to the electorate. This new type of politics, hereafter 
called digital populism, calls for a renegotiation of the 
putative contract between electors and elected.
What Is Populism?
The issues of direct representation and popular partici-
pation lie at the very center of populist appeals because 
“deliberations and secret elections [are] redundant im-
pediments to a direct expression of the popular will.”8 
Populism offers a dichotomous vision of politics and 
society that places the people in opposition to political 
elites whose legitimacy is questioned. Europe and Latin 
America have a long history of populist leaders and par-
ties, and even East Asia has had its fair share of populist 
leaders: former presidents Chen Shui-bian (of Taiwan) 
and Roh Moo-hyun (South Korea) and former prime 
minister Junichiro Koizumi (Japan) have been often 
characterized as such, often more because of their style 
of leadership than out of substance.
Scholarship on the subject of populism indicates a pre-
supposition of a clear and antagonistic dichotomy be-
tween the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”;9 as a 
solution, populism proposes an unmediated link between 
the people and the leader,10 thus leading to unmediated 
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popular sovereignty.11 Abts and Rummens argue that 
populism is mainly concerned with direct participation 
of “the people.” In this light, “deliberations and secret 
elections” are “redundant impediments to a direct ex-
pression of the popular will.”12
Defi ning populism is by no means easy. The concept of 
populism is “diffi cult and slippery.”13 As a type of be-
havior, populism has involved various segments of the 
population, ranging from elites to ordinary people. Often 
they are not united by strong or cohesive ideological glue 
(values or interests). The term populism is often used to 
highlight movements and phenomena that occur from the 
extreme left to the extreme right end of the ideological 
spectrum. Taggart describes populism as “an episodic, 
anti-political, empty-hearted, chameleonic celebration of 
the heartland in the face of crisis.”14 For Taggart it is a 
combination of “a movement, leader, regime or idea,”15 
and Taggart also notes that “populist movements have 
systems of belief which are diffuse; they are inherently 
diffi cult to control and organize; they lack consistency; 
and their activity waxes and wanes with a bewildering 
frequency.”16
Populism can comprise both elite-driven and mass-ini-
tiated political action. For elites, populism has been ac-
tively used (or they have been accused of using it) when 
they tried to attract ordinary people’s support. Populism 
has been seen in many cases in Latin America as well 
as in many recent popular political leaders such as Tony 
Blair (in the United Kingdom), Koizumi, and Roh. Some 
populists do not mind being called populists.17
Abts and Rummens identify three main characteristics 
of populism.18 First, it entails an antagonistic relation-
ship between “the people” and “the elite.”19 Mudde also 
defi nes populism as “an ideology that considers society 
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the cor-
rupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale [general will] of the 
people.”20
Second, populism calls for the restoration of popular sov-
ereignty. Populism favors direct democracy, as populists 
believe democracy should be derived from the power 
of the people. This ideology based on the people guides 
populists to reject representative democracy and delegiti-
mize established elites. Zaslove maintains that populist 
emphasis on popular sovereignty is dangerous, as this 
threatens “pluralism and democratic representative insti-
tutions.”21
Finally “the people” are understood as constituting a 
“homogeneous unity.”22 The people are a “non-plural, 
virtuous, and homogeneous group[s] that are part of the 
‘everyday’ and the ‘normal’ core of the country.”23 The 
people being one, it can only have one voice. This rein-
forces the us-versus-them antagonism that can even lead 
to overthrowing the established political order.
When Populism Meets Digital Technology
When populist activities take place in a highly developed 
information technology environment, populism acquires 
a critical tool that can ease recruitment of like-minded 
people and mobilize them as well as further intensify so-
cial antagonism and witch-hunting behavior. So, when 
populism meets digital technology, the meeting engen-
ders three main effects that are politically relevant. 
First, for the politicians or populist activists the use of 
the Internet as a political tool provides low-cost (or even 
free) access to the grass roots, the potential ordinary 
supporters and voters. Transaction costs are lowered 
(compared with costs for ordinary recruitment), and the 
reliance on online networks potentially yields a greater 
mobilizational capacity as it reaches out to more people 
at the same time.
Second, the unmediated nature of the means (open dis-
cussion boards, chats, and blogs) can lead people to free-
ly and promptly respond to an event or make a comment 
without pausing for refl ection or, more crucially, pausing 
for acquiring suffi cient information or double-checking 
the information provided. The means become the source 
of information. Mudde has noted the crucial function of 
the media in populism: the media gain more indepen-
dence from the state and depend on the market for their 
fi nancial support when they tend to focus on “the more 
extreme and scandalous aspects of politics.”24 The focus 
on political scandals promotes exactly the type of “anti-
elite sentiment” that populist actors seek to create.25 Or-
dinary people can now create their own political blogs 
and upload fi lms, photos, and cartoons. The emergence 
of infl uential blogs such as the Huffi ngton Post in the 
United States and the use of the Internet as a recruitment 
tool and fund-raising instrument during the recent U.S. 
electoral campaign are obviously positive developments 
in the close relationship between Internet and politics. 
Finally, immediacy and the lack of mediation—increas-
ingly common in South Korea—allow verbal violence 
and witch-hunting. After netizens identify a target, a true 
online war against the enemy can be waged. The gov-
ernment’s Web site may be hacked, TV celebrities can 
become the embodiment of all evil, and ordinary citizens 
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accused of fi nancial frauds true or imagined can be tar-
geted. Moreover, the fact that at present Internet users 
can hide behind nicknames and hidden identities leaves 
these attacks mostly unsanctioned. So, how does this all 
translate in the Korean context?
Populism Korean Style?
The case of former president Roh Moo-hyun’s presiden-
tial election in 2002 well illustrates the increasing role 
played by Internet in Korean politics. Roh Moo-hyun 
was a charismatic leader who became a leading politician 
despite being only a high school graduate (in a country 
where a university degree is a must for supporting am-
bition) and therefore without any university affi liation, 
a crucial resource in Korean society and politics. Roh 
Moo-hyun’s ascent to prominence dates to the hearing 
about the corruption assessments of the Fifth Republic in 
1988. His man-of-the-street style (and language) toward 
the formality of President Chun Doo-hwan and other 
high offi cials during the “question time” resonated with 
the TV audience angry at the authoritarian and corrupt 
government. He soon became the hearing’s superstar.
As a person outside the system (no alumni ties, no party 
background), Roh Moo-hyun could not rely on many 
supporters within a party when he became a presiden-
tial candidate in 2002. His sources of support lay outside 
the party system, in the “Rohsamo,” in other words, the 
society of people who love Roh Moo-hyun. Rohsamo 
was a movement consisting of young progressives who 
made widespread use of the Internet for social purposes 
as well as, it turned out, political goals. The Rohsamo 
netizens helped raise funds to support Roh Moo-hyun, 
and they organized meetings at their own expense. A 
bottom-up political campaign orchestrated through chats 
and online discussions contributed to elevate Roh to the 
presidency.
 
A second case illustrative of how online discussions 
turn into street politics occurred on the occasion of the 
candlelight vigils held when two junior high school stu-
dents were accidentally killed by a U.S. military vehicle 
in June 2002. Popular anger against the U.S. military 
court’s decision (which found the U.S. soldiers not guilty 
because this was an accident during their military duty) 
continued for several months. What started as protests 
by younger citizens (even teenagers) turned into political 
calls for renegotiating Korea’s Status of Forces Agree-
ment with the United States.
More recently, new protests started with expressions 
of disapproval at President Lee Myung-bak’s initiative, 
soon after his election, to introduce a key reform in Ko-
rea’s education system. The committee working on the 
reform announced that by 2010 most high school edu-
cation would be conducted in English. Promoting Eng-
lish-speaking skills among pupils, their argument went, 
would help solve the problems of parents spending a lot 
of money on private-tuition education or even sending 
their children (along with their mothers) abroad to be 
educated, an increasingly common situation in Korean 
families. The new term for this kind of situation is gire-
ogi appa (a wild goose daddy), referring to a father who 
travels abroad to see his family but comes back home 
alone to work. One effect of the policy would have been 
that students, teachers, and even parents would have had 
to spend a lot of money and time to learn English in a 
short period of time. This, the opponents of the initiative 
maintained, would reinforce the cleavage between the 
richer and the poorer segments of Korean society, who 
would inevitably lose out after the change as they could 
not afford private tuition.
Although protests over this policy initiative had not yet 
quieted, a new wave of protests broke out. In April 2008 
the government announced its signing of the FTA be-
tween South Korea and the United States. While the an-
nouncement was heralded as an opportunity for Korean 
businesses to gain even greater access to the U.S. mar-
ket, frustration and anger were boiling among the people. 
One of the issues at stake—and defi nitely the one that 
most captured the public’s imagination and attention—
concerned the implications that beef imports would have 
for the health of the Korean population. Korean objec-
tions were based on the possibility that the beef could 
have been affected by mad-cow disease.
While one may dispute the benefi ts or disadvantages as-
sociated with the FTA per se, what was striking was that 
the protests grew out of rumors such as “Korean genes 
are especially exposed and vulnerable to mad-cow dis-
ease,” “Americans do not eat American beef; instead 
they import beef from Australia or New Zealand,” “In 
the United States beef from cattle older than 30 months 
is not used even for dog or cat food,” “Beef for domestic 
users in the United States is different from the beef ex-
ported to Korea,” and “In the United States there are fi ve 
million Alzheimer’s patients; among those, 250,000 to 
650,000 patients are assumed to be suffering from mad-
cow disease.”26
Rumors are common in most societies and, of course, 
are not alien to political affairs. However, these kinds 
of rumors received considerable attention (one may say 
support) from the Korean media in, for example, the ma-
jor current affairs TV program, PD Sucheop [Producer’s 
Note] on 29 April 2008 when it aired a broadcast on mad-
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cow disease. Later in 2008 the program, which included 
erroneous reports over the mad-cow issue, was criticized 
for its strongly antigovernment agenda. During National 
Assembly hearings on FTA-related incidents in Korea, 
one member of the Grand National Party accused the TV 
program of being a main source of rumors.27
The PD Sucheop broadcast led to an emotional reaction. 
Rumors fed other rumors, including that cheap, imported 
beef from the United States would be used for school 
lunches for children. Fear for children’s health caused a 
panic that led to the candlelight vigils. Online discussion 
boards were dominated by this one issue, and Internet 
bloggers uploaded the PD Sucheop program on their 
Web sites. The program circulated more and more, gain-
ing an even wider audience receptive of the groundless 
rumors. This appeared to be especially popular among 
teenagers, generating many satirical short movies and 
cartoons among youngsters.28 A high school student sug-
gested in an internet discussion café that there should be a 
presidential impeachment; within three days the Web site 
received a million visitors (and supporters) who signed 
an online call for presidential impeachment.29 The vig-
ils were initially peaceful and often rather like a festival, 
with entertainers singing and dancing. This festival-like 
atmosphere came to an end when protests became more 
violent and were met by riot police and a government 
crackdown.
The real origins of the rumors that stimulated the candle-
light vigils (PD Sucheop; or the mainstream media such 
as Chosun Ilbo, Donga Ilbo, Jungang Ilbo; or even inex-
perienced government offi cials) are still disputed. MBC 
(Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation) and KBS (Korea 
Broadcasting System) are state-run companies, and many 
of the high offi cials within the companies were appointed 
by the previous governments and held progressive views. 
Thus, many current-affairs programs seemed to promote 
an antigovernment political agenda.
The aim of this paper is not to judge the rights or wrongs 
of the wave of popular protests or whether this was a 
democratic or even desirable way of expressing dis-
satisfaction with the government. Popular protests and 
uprisings have played crucial roles in bringing authori-
tarian rules to their end, and they have contributed to de-
mocratization. The problem here is that the candlelight 
vigils showed strong elements of what can be termed 
digital populism, namely a new type of political behav-
ior marked by the use of the Internet as both a form of 
direct political participation and an instrument of social 
mobilization.
The three dimensions of populist behavior referred to 
earlier lead to the hypothesis that what happened earlier 
this year in the streets of Korean cities well conforms 
to this type of political phenomenon. Protests were ar-
ticulated along a line that set into opposition ordinary 
citizens and elites (elites whom, incidentally, the citizens 
had elected a few months earlier) in a way that construed 
the two groups as enemies and thus available for all pos-
sible attacks. Citizens were portrayed as a homogenous 
group (us), allegedly representing not only common 
sense (Who would want to have their children poisoned 
by unhealthy beef?) but also the so-called true majority. 
Protests, online and on the streets, represented the way 
to restore popular sovereignty and will that had been lost 
to the unrepresentative government institutions. In ad-
dition, the populist narrative could count on a powerful 
instrument: the Internet. Spreading news and recruiting 
additional protesters were made easy and cheap via the 
popularity of blogs and chats that reduced signifi cantly 
the cost of getting out the news of meetings (times and 
venues). 
Thus, the Lee Myung-bak administration plunged into 
political paralysis. Support for the Lee administration 
after the presidential election did not last even three 
months. The representative system of the National As-
sembly and the politicians within it could not play a me-
diating role between the state and the citizens; the an-
gry citizens marched to the Blue House to talk with the 
president directly, and police offi cers aligned containers 
on the main road leading to the Blue House as a way to 
fence off protesters.30
Conclusion
A paradox is becoming increasingly common in South 
Korea: the more widespread the access to information 
technology, the more opportunities citizens have to par-
ticipate in politics, make their voices heard, and become 
politically active. This is certainly positive in cases where 
e-government links rulers and ruled and where political 
campaigns recruit and mobilize those who would not 
otherwise take part, let alone vote. However, the riots as-
sociated with candlelight vigils and the acrimony that has 
accompanied online debates also show a less benign face 
of this phenomenon.
As I noted elsewhere, the South Korean political party 
system suffers from a low level of institutionalization.31 
This is problematic because it affects the way in which 
citizens connect (or not) with political parties as the in-
termediary organizations between themselves and the 
government. Parties lose their linkage role with ordinary 
citizens, opening the space for alternative means for pop-
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ular participation. The Internet offers such an opportu-
nity for direct, unmediated participation.
The decline in the linkage role of representative orga-
nizations and the availability of an immediate and low-
cost instrument for voicing unrestricted opinions pose a 
challenge to representative democracy, as Mudde notes, 
citing Ralf Dahrendorf when he says, “one’s populism 
is someone else’s democracy, and vice versa.”32 As digi-
tal technology allows more people to access direct po-
litical debates with politicians or even presidential blogs, 
home pages, and e-government facilities, digital popu-
lism seems to bring revolutionary direct participation 
into politics. As Abts and Rummens note, some scholars 
have analysed populism “as a means to reveal and even 
amend the shortcomings and the broken promises of the 
representative system.”33 Moreover, “[i]t can bring back 
the disruptive noise of the people and thus prevent the 
closure of the formal political system.”34 However this 
very same phenomenon is also referred to as “a patho-
logical form of democracy”35 or “dangerous threat to de-
mocracy,”36 given that direct participation aims to bypass 
the allegedly fl awed representative institutions.
The Internet is playing an increasingly infl uential role 
in shaping Korean public and political life, from the 
campaign that led to the election of Roh Moo-hyun as 
president in 2002 to the candlelight vigils in the spring 
of 2008. This of course is not unique to Korea. What is 
peculiar to Korea is the scale of the phenomenon and the 
extent to which online political debates have become vi-
cious and abusive, as well as the speed with which on-
line discussions have been taken into the streets. Policy 
debates are now ongoing as to how to tackle the issue 
most effectively, but there appears to be no easy way 
to address the challenge that digital populism poses to 
a democratic society that is caught between the choices 
of imposing restrictions to freedom of speech and deal-
ing with the emotional and often abusive behavior of an 
unchecked minority.
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